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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Carlos Orlando Zamora appeals from judgments on three felonies and 
four misdemeanors entered after his conditional guilty pleas.  He challenges the 
denial of his motion to suppress evidence. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The state charged Zamora with possession of methamphetamine with a 
persistent violator enhancement (R., pp. 139-42); intimidating a witness on 
February 16, 2015 (R., pp. 182-83); intimidating a witness on March 13 and 15, 
2015, and four counts of violating a no-contact order (R., pp. 233-36); attempted 
strangulation, felony domestic battery, and kidnapping (R., pp. 38-40); and 
misdemeanor possession of marijuana and paraphernalia (R., p. 8).  The state 
moved to consolidate the five cases (R., pp. 243-45), which the district court 
granted (R., pp. 254-55).   
 Zamora moved to suppress evidence and dismiss the cases.  (R., pp. 264-
65.)  The issue presented by the motions was: “Whether a custodial 
interrogation, initiated by the Prosecuting Attorney, through employees of the 
Prosecutor's Office, after the Defendant has been appointed counsel, violates the 
Defendant’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel as well as IRPC 
4.2 and 5.3.”  (R., p. 267.)  At the hearing on the motion Zamora “additionally 
argued” that the interview also violated the Fifth Amendment, and the state 
constitution’s equivalent guarantees of counsel and against compelled self-
incrimination.  (R., p. 346.) 
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 The district court denied the motion to suppress and dismiss.  (R., pp. 
345-52.)  The district court denied the Fifth Amendment claim on the basis that 
Zamora had waived his Miranda rights.  (R., pp. 348-49.)  The district court 
denied the Sixth Amendment claim on the basis that the subject of the interview 
was uncharged conduct.  (R., pp. 349-51.) 
 Zamora pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine, two counts of 
intimidating a witness, two misdemeanor counts of violating a no-contact order 
and two misdemeanor counts of domestic battery.  (R., pp. 359, 366.)  The 
remaining counts were dismissed.  (R., p. 367.)  The pleas were conditional 
because Zamora preserved his right to appeal the denial of his suppression 
motion.  (R., pp. 366-367.)  Zamora filed a notice of appeal timely from the 
judgments.  (R., pp. 423-26, 431, 433-36.) 
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ISSUES 
 
 Zamora states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Zamora’s motion to 
suppress and dismiss? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Zamora failed to show error in the district court’s determination that 
he validly waived his Miranda rights? 
 
2. Has Zamora failed to show error in the district court’s determination that 
he did not have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel in relation to 
questioning about uncharged conduct? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
Zamora Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Determination That He 
Validly Waived His Miranda Rights 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 The district court found that prior to any questioning the investigator 
informed Zamora of his Miranda rights.  (R., pp. 345-46.)  After informing Zamora 
of his Miranda rights she asked Zamora if he understood those rights and 
Zamora responded in the affirmative.  (R., p. 346.)  The investigator then 
informed Zamora that he could stop the questioning at any time, to which Zamora 
responded, “Okay.”  (Id.)  Only then did the investigator question Zamora.  (Id.) 
 On appeal Zamora argues that the correct recitation of his Miranda rights 
by the investigator, his affirmative response when asked if he understood his 
rights, and his affirmative indication that he understood he could end the 
interview at any time, followed by Zamora affirmatively answering questions, was 
an insufficient factual basis for finding that his Miranda rights were not violated.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-9.)  Zamora’s argument is meritless. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The trial court’s conclusion that a defendant made a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights will not be disturbed on appeal where it is 
supported by substantial and competent evidence.”  State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 
294, 297, 1 P.3d 795, 798 (2000).  See also State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 851-
52, 26 P.3d 31, 34-35 (2001); State v. Person, 140 Idaho 934, 937, 104 P.3d 
976, 979 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 260, 267, 47 P.3d 763, 770 
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(Ct. App. 2001).  “At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of 
witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences 
is vested in the trial court.”  Person, 140 Idaho at 937, 104 P.3d at 979.  See 
also State v. Dunn, 134 Idaho 165, 169, 997 P.2d 626, 630 (Ct. App. 2000); 
State v. Nobles, 122 Idaho 509, 835 P.2d 1320 (Ct. App. 1991).  The appellate 
court applies all presumptions in favor of the trial court’s exercise of that power, 
and the trial court’s findings on such matters will be upheld if they are supported 
by substantial evidence.  Nobles, 122 Idaho at 512, 835 P.2d at 1323. 
 
C. Zamora’s Decision To Answer Questions After Affirmatively Stating He 
Understood His Miranda Rights After Those Rights Were Explained To 
Him Was A Waiver Of His Rights 
 
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the prosecution 
“does not need to show that a waiver of Miranda rights was express.”  Berghuis 
v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010).  Rather, an “implicit waiver of the right 
to remain silent is sufficient to admit a suspect’s statement into evidence.”  Id. 
(internal quotes and cites omitted).  “Where the prosecution shows that a 
Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an 
accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to 
remain silent.”  Id.  “[A] suspect who has received and understood the Miranda 
warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to remain 
silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police.”  Id. at 388-89.   
The district court found that Zamora was informed of his Miranda rights, 
stated he understood them, did not invoke them, and made uncoerced 
statements: 
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Here, the defendant was read the Miranda warnings and indicated 
he understood them. He further was told he could terminate the 
questioning at any time and indicated he also understood that. He 
then proceeding [sic] to answer questions and did not invoke any of 
the Miranda protections, thereby waiving any Fifth Amendment 
protections he may otherwise have had. 
 
(R., p. 349.)  The district court correctly concluded that Zamora failed to show 
any Miranda violation.  
On appeal “Zamora asserts that the audio recording does not prove that 
his waiver was knowing, intelligent and voluntary because his simple response of 
‘Okay’ did not make it clear that he understood his rights before he started 
answering questions.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)  This argument misstates the 
facts.1  The district court found, and this finding is supported by the record, that 
after informing Zamora of his Miranda rights, Investigator Walker asked, “Do you 
understand each of these rights as I have explained to you?”  (R., p. 346.)  
Zamora responded, “Uh-huh.”  (R., p. 346.)  Zamora’s response of “Okay” was 
made in relation to Investigator Walker’s statement that Zamora could end the 
interview “at any point in time you don’t want to talk to me.”  (Id.)  The evidence 
shows that Zamora answered affirmatively when asked if he understood his 
rights, and his affirmative answer is sufficient to support the district court’s finding 
that Zamora understood his rights.  Zamora’s appellate claim that he did not 
affirmatively indicate he understood his rights is false, and does not show error. 
 
  
                                            
1 Zamora makes his argument “[m]indful of the fact” the recording shows he 
“confirmed that he understood his Miranda rights and said, ‘Okay,’” and that this 
response likely supports the district court’s factual finding of a valid Miranda 
waiver.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 9.) 
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II. 
Zamora Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Determination That He 
Did Not Have A Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel In Relation To Questioning 
About Uncharged Conduct 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 The district court denied Zamora’s claim that his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel was violated on the basis that the subject of the interview was 
uncharged conduct, and therefore no Sixth Amendment right had attached.  (R., 
pp. 349-51.)  “Mindful of the applicable precedent holding that the Sixth 
Amendment right is offense specific,” Zamora argues the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel should be extended in his case to “closely intertwined” uncharged 
offenses.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 11.)  As Zamora acknowledges, his argument is 
contrary to established law.  He makes no argument as to how this Court may 
overrule the interpretation of the Sixth Amendment provided by the Supreme 
Court of the United States.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s 
findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review 
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.”  State v. 
Bagshaw, 141 Idaho 257, 259, 108 P.3d 404, 406 (Ct. App. 2004). 
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C. This Court Should Reject Zamora’s Invitation To Overrule The Supreme 
Court Of The United States’ Interpretation Of The Sixth Amendment 
 
 The applicable legal standard is well established: 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution assures 
that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused enjoys the right “to 
have the assistance of counsel for his defense.” Unlike the Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel, which applies whenever a suspect is 
in custody, the Sixth Amendment right does not arise until the 
suspect has become a defendant in a criminal proceeding. The 
commencement of the criminal prosecution, whether by way of 
formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or 
arraignment, marks the “critical stage of the prosecution” to which 
the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applicable. 
 
State v. Tapp, 136 Idaho 354, 363, 33 P.3d 828, 837 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing Kirby 
v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972), other citations and quotations omitted).  
Once the right attaches, it is “offense specific,” such that it does not apply to 
uncharged crimes, “as to which the Sixth Amendment right has not yet attached.”  
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991) (internal quotations omitted).  
“Accordingly, [the Court has] held that a defendant’s statements regarding 
offenses for which he had not been charged were admissible notwithstanding the 
attachment of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel on other charged offenses.”  
Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 168 (2001).  This is true even if the charged and 
uncharged crimes are “factually related.”  Id.; see also Rothgery v. Gillespie 
County, Tex., 554 U.S. 191, 230 (2008) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
“attaches only to those offenses for which the defendant has been formally 
charged, and not to other offenses closely related factually to the charged 
offense” (internal quotations omitted)).   
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 The district court applied the legal standard set forth by the Supreme 
Court of the United States and concluded that because the interview with Zamora 
was conducted in relation to uncharged conduct, it did not violate Zamora’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel.   (R., pp. 349-51.)  Zamora is “[m]indful” that the 
district court applied the correct legal standard to the facts of this case, but 
argues for a legal standard whereby the Sixth Amendment right to counsel would 
extend not only to charged offenses but to matters “closely intertwined” with 
those charges.  (Appellant’s brief, p. 11.)  This argument fails because the 
Supreme Court of the United States has specifically rejected this definition of the 
Sixth Amendment.  Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 230; Cobb, 532 U.S. at 168.  Zamora 
has therefore failed to show error. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Zamora’s convictions. 
 DATED this 19th day of May, 2016. 
 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of May, 2016, served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an 
electronic copy to: 
 
 REED P. ANDERSON 
 DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
 
at the following email address:  briefs@sapd.state.id.us. 
 
 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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